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How, as educationalists, should we read Gramsci today? This is 
the stance adopted by Massimo Balducci to call the attention of 
scholars, in particular educationalists and pedagogues, to the 
actuality of Gramsci’s thought on the question of the formation of 
the human subject. His volume Oltre la subalternità. Praxis e educazione 
in Gramsci [Beyond Subalternity. Praxis and Education in Gramsci]1 aims 
at a “new pedagogic reading of Gramsci’s thought” (p. 8) following 
the question he poses of what is the meaning of thinking out in a 
“Gramscian” way the pedagogic bases of our times? To what use 
can we today put his educational theory? 
The persistent lack of attention of contemporary pedagogy vis-à-
vis Gramsci’s thought does indeed remain an open question. This 
substantial silence seems to be predominantly the result of the way 
in which Gramsci’s thought was for long interpreted, following on 
the complex interweaving of his political and intellectual biography, 
of Italian history and of the editions of his writings: All these fact-
ors have conditioned the reception even of his pedagogical thought 
– as regards that part of his life which he was able to determine for 
himself, Gramsci was, as we know, a militant intellectual, journalist, 
and founder and leader of the Communist Party of Italy. Taking 
into account the involvement of the scientific community, which 
beginning from the mid-1970s has had at its disposal the critical 
edition of Gramsci’s prison writings, it now seems the right time to 
ask once more not only “what he really said” but also and above all 
“what he can still say to us” (p. 8). Assuming without further ado 
the point of view of the practical utility of Gramsci’s thought, 
Baldacci’s reconsideration takes as a privileged standpoint that of 
theoretical-dialectical pedagogy. In the current situation of the 
“politico-cultural hegemony of neoliberalism” the need to 
“supersede the new forms of cultural and mental subalternity linked 
to this” (pp. 9-10) is ever stronger and Gramsci here can be of use. 
                                                 
1 Massimo Balducci, Praxis e educazione in Gramsci, Roma: Carocci, 2017. 
 





2. Education, antithesis and conformism: the quest for pedagogical unity 
The book is divided into a number of densely written chapters: 
Reading Gramsci as Pedagogues; Gramsci’s Interpretations of Pedagogy; 
Rethinking Gramsci, Using Gramsci. The book is mainly centred on the 
analysis of the prison Notebooks with few and brief comments being 
devoted to the pre-prison writings and the letters. After a close 
examination of the more important interpretations of Gramscian 
pedagogy of the last century (Urbani, Broccoli, Manacorda) and a 
critical run-down of a number of conceptual nodes of educational 
theory, Baldacci argues that Gramsci’s “pedagogy” cannot be taken 
in isolation from the Notebooks in their entirety and from his work, 
but “constitute a perspective” from the inside (p. 7). This pedagogy is 
not then to be understood as the nth “sector” of his thought, but 
represents precisely – this is the book’s basic argument – “an 
internal side of the philosophy of praxis” or “this whole philosophy 
conceived from the perspective of this pedagogical side” (p. 9). 
Baldacci proposes a broad conception of Gramsci’s pedagogy, not 
limited to the school, but projected within the horizon of the whole 
of society and within the perspective of permanent training, and of 
a dual-nature process: 1) education as an antithesis, in other words 
as a struggle against the dominant common sense for the con-
struction of a “higher culture” and a “new mentality”; 2) education 
as a new conformism, as a process appropriate to making man 
precisely “conformant to a given conception of the world and, in a 
strong sense, to a given organization of production” (p. 250). Of 
these two inseparable sides, Baldacci’s intention is to privilege the 
former, the one in which education and politics coincide in the optic 
of the “formation of a new subjectivity, able to supersede the 
subaltern mentality in order to don the clothes of the leaders” 
(ibid.). To educate in a Gramscian sense means, then, in essence to 
set in motion a pedagogical-cultural struggle that allows one to go 
beyond subalternity. 
 
3. The pedagogical challenge: how escape from the “primitive philosophy of 
common sense” 
“Our work starts off from a different assumption, which devel-
ops one of Broccoli’s arguments. Our attempt represents the ident-
ification of Gramsci’s pedagogic thought with one side of the 
philosophy praxis – Baldacci argues – the ‘critical’ side” or “this 
 





entire philosophy seen from the perspective of that side. This 
approach does not suppress the importance of the categories of 
hegemony (emphasized by Urbani and Broccoli) conformism (Manacor-
da) or historical bloc (Broccoli) but leads to contextualizing these cate- 
gories within the perspective of the philosophy of praxis” (p. 175). 
Baldacci acknowledges a great merit in Gramsci: his honesty in 
recognizing “the ambiguity of the educational relationship” which 
in its “concrete historical form” includes both a persuasive aspect and 
a coercive aspect (p. 85). The educational relationship is “the first 
hegemonic relationship (and therefore one of power) that human 
beings experiences in their social existence” (p. 86). It is not intrin-
sically emancipatory: in so far as it is a “molecular translation of the 
hegemonic relationship, it shares the power structure with this 
latter” (p. 87) and can therefore become “as much a device of 
subjection (…) as a factor of emancipation (p. 87). The coercion-
consent relationship may be directed towards the emancipation of 
the subalterns or to the maintenance of their subaltern status. And 
here a third element and criterion intervenes, which is the 
conception of the world represented by the philosophy of praxis, a 
philosophy which “does not does not tend to leave the ‘simple’ in 
their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead 
them to a higher conception of life”.2 In this sense the “hegemonic-
pedagogical process has an emancipatory capacity only if it is united 
to an authentic will for the liberation of the subject” (p. 88). The 
connection between pedagogy and Gramscian philosophy runs 
deep: “pedagogy must be seen from the viewpoint of the 
transformatory praxis of existing mentalities, aimed at intellectual 
and moral reform”, and as such represents the critical side of the 
philosophy of praxis at the formative level (p. 176). 
 
4. Gramsci as pedagogue, a discontinuous interest: Urban, Broccoli and 
Manacorda 
The question regarding the pedagogical use of Gramsci’s thought 
begins from the interest in testing its practical validity at the present 
time, the reason for which Baldacci introduces first of all a number 
of methodological questions regarding the interpretations of the 
                                                 
2 A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, ed. V. Gerratana (hereafter QdC), Torino: Einaudi 1975, 
Q11§12, p. 1384. In English Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter SPN), ed. and tr. Q. 
Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1971, p. 332. 
 





Prison Notebooks aimed at clarifying the impossibility of an 
“innocent” reading of Gramsci, and the presuppositions that guide 
his own interpretation, as in the case of any interpretation. These 
guidelines are the elaboration of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis as 
an original conception, here called critical Marxism; the relational 
and dialectical construction of the concepts; and the influence of 
the political nature of Gramsci’s interpretations on the way of 
reading their pedagogy.  
After rapidly going over later publications, such as those of 
Orsomarso, Maltese and others, and pausing in particular over the 
interpretation given by Dario Ragazzini in his Società industriale e 
formazione umana (1976), Baldacci’s volume concentrates on just a 
few publications, but those “of prime importance”, which have 
become a reference point for pedagogical studies on Gramsci, 
namely the readings given by Urbani, Broccoli and Manacorda. It 
singles out a number of key concepts (or conceptual relations) 
characterizing these works and subjects them to a critical 
examination. These concepts range from the historically polysemic 
one of hegemony (an in-depth analysis that includes its aspects of 
hegemonic apparatus and ideology) through to those of historical bloc, 
conformism (in its dynamic and its creative aspects), and most of all the 
philosophy of praxis. We are here dealing with interpretations that lie 
in two sub-periods (1964-75, and 1956-64) of that phase of the 
interpretation of Gramsci that Baldacci calls post-Togliattian (1964-
1989) – differentiating it from the preceding Togliattian phase 
(1944-1964) and the successive post-communist one (after 1989) 
characterized by the so-called “Fordist factory” and by specific 
forms of the conflict between capital and labour. 
Baldacci underlines a number of problematic aspects of all three 
interpretations. Giovanni Urbani, who (like Broccoli but different 
from Manacorda) was unable to consult the critical edition of the 
Prison Notebooks, centred his analysis mainly on the education-hegemony 
relation.3 He argued that in Gramsci the historical and formative 
processes are superposed and that there is an exemplary analogy 
between the educational relationship and the hegemonic one, both 
understood as progressive processes, with reference to Gramsci’s 
postulate: “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an 
                                                 
3 Cf. the Introduction to Antonio Gramsci, La formazione dell’uomo: scritti di pedagogia, ed. Giovanni 
Urbani, Roma: Editori Riuniti 1967. 
 





educational relationship”.4 Baldacci however makes the objection 
that the meaning of the hegemonic relationship as always a 
progressive equilibrium – in so far as it is formative – does not 
correspond to the concept of hegemony in Gramsci. Understood in 
its broad meaning, as the unity of leadership-domination, force and 
consent, the hegemonic relationship reveals an asymmetry between 
leaders-led, rulers-ruled that may imply different solutions. There 
are the educators/politicians who “would like to confine men for 
ever to the cradle”5 and those who see in the moment of force only 
a transitional point of the educational process. In the second case 
we are dealing with the “dynamic educational relationship”, the 
only one aimed at emancipation from the position of being 
subaltern. The risk Urbani runs, instead, is that of sliding into a 
culturalist vision of human formation by arguing that we are dealing 
only with making uniform the deformed degree of “critical 
awareness” or “cultural level” between the two groups.  
Mario Alighieri Manacorda’s Il principio educativo in Gramsci. 
Americanismo e conformismo6 deals with the subject of formation in 
Gramsci in a non-sectoralized perspective, commenting analytically 
on the passages of pedagogic interest in his writings in connection 
with the theoretical motif of Americanism, located at the base of the 
educational principle. Additionally it puts at the centre the category 
of conformism in contrast to that of educational spontaneity. In 
Baldacci’s view Manacorda “provides us with an organic and 
coherent interpretation of Gramsci’s pedagogical thought, destined 
to become the mainstream interpretation” (p. 114). The “peda-
gogical” passages, however, do not seem sufficiently well-inserted 
in the overall context of Gramsci’s thought. The hypothesis of a 
cypher by which Gramsci speaks of Americanism since he cannot 
speak of the Soviet Union is assumed uncritically. But, above all, 
putting the category of educational conformism at the centre would 
end up with an excessive accentuation of the component of 
“discipline” in the formative process, with the risk of presenting 
Gramsci’s pedagogy as a sort of “pedagogical economism” in which 
the form of education is coercive and its content determined by 
                                                 
4 QdC, cit., Q10II§44, p. 1331. In English, SPN, cit., p. 350. 
5 QdC, cit., Q11§1, p. 1366. In English Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter 
FSPN), ed. and tr. D. Boothman, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1995, cit., p. 158. 
6 Mario Alighieri Manacorda, Il principio educativo in Gramsci. Americanismo e conformismo, Roma: 
Armando 1970. 
 





industrial production. Even when Manacorda underlines the 
importance that the subaltern strata (ceti), in wanting to be their 
own leaders, should assume the perspective of a proposed conformism 
(by which one reaches a collective belonging together through a 
“stage comprising the development of individuality and critical 
personality”7 rejecting an imposed conformism of an authoritarian and 
regressive type), he does not take the argument to its extreme 
conclusion. The concept of proposed conformism is understood 
only if it is inserted within the “framework of the philosophy of praxis, 
within which the emancipation of the subalterns assumes priority” 
as the end of the division between leaders and subalterns: “self-
discipline means becoming leaders of oneselves (p. 119). 
The interpretation that, in Baldacci’s opinion, is the richest and 
most articulated in terms of educational topics is that of Angelo 
Broccoli. In his Antonio Gramsci e l’educazione come egemonia8 the 
education-hegemony relation again assumes a central position, but 
with a dynamic conception being attached to both. If hegemony – while 
being understood essentially from the cultural side as the 
intellectual-mass dialectic – changes in time, tending to develop 
“ever more advanced forms of aware participation”, then it follows 
that this dynamic feature influences the pedagogic relationship. This 
relationship, understood as the master-pupil relation between two 
historical blocs, is modified together with the progressive retreat of 
the folklore element and is therefore configured in “active, 
reciprocal, dynamic, relational” terms. In addition, in Baldacci’s view, 
Broccoli gives full value to the conformism-historical bloc connection 
(arguing that the educational conformation changes in time 
alongside the hegemonic relationship) and to creative conformism as a 
process not only of “adaptation to the historical process” but also 
adaptation “of the historical process through a collective effort, in 
which all participate in their own original way” (p. 137). Indeed, the 
historical bloc is a “processual unity between the action of material 
social forces and the active reaction constituted by their ideological 
elaboration” (p. 143). However, as Baldacci argues, creativity for 
Gramsci is to be understood in the framework of the philosophy of 
praxis, in so far as it expresses the possibility of transforming reality 
as the transformation of common sense, as the way of “feeling” 
                                                 
7 QdC, cit., Q9§23, p. 1111; in English FSPN, cit., p. 270.  
8 A. Broccoli. Antonio Gramsci e l’educazione come egemonia, Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1972. 
 





and “thinking” of the masses, as the diffusion of a “new conception 
able to put itself forward as a principle of action” (p. 146), as an 
“active norm of conduct”.9 In his successive work (Ideologia e 
educazione, 1974) Broccoli values this connection to the full, ident-
ifying in the philosophy of praxis the “central motif that animates 
Gramsci’s pedagogical thought”, a “fundamental point for a new 
interpretation (and a new use) of his pedagogical thought” (p. 147). 
 
5. Only the philosophy of praxis is directed to the emancipation of the subalterns 
Tracing his way through Gramsci’s three series of Notes on 
Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism (May 1930-May 1932), Baldacci’s 
intention is to reconstruct the “diachronic pathway of the 
philosophy of praxis and of pedagogy” (p. 181). Gramsci’s 
formulation of the relationship science-common sense makes the 
basic pedagogic theme of intellectual and moral reform emerge as the 
“the mind’s revolutionary dialectic”, a struggle against folklore to create a 
“new mental order (a higher type of thought)” (p. 180). Baldacci 
identifies in Q8§220 (March 1932) the place in the text where we 
first find the emergence of the “intrinsic pedagogical side of the philosophy 
of praxis”: 
 
A philosophy of praxis must initially adopt a polemical stance, as 
superseding the existing mode of thinking. It must therefore present itself as a 
critique of “common sense” (but only after it has based itself on common 
sense in order to know show that “everyone” is a philosopher and that the 
point is not to introduce a totally new form of knowledge into “everyone’s” 
individual life, but to revitalize an already existing activity and make it critical). 
It must also present itself as a critique of the intellectuals, put of which the 
history of the intellectuals arises.10  
 
Here however we have to state a certain perplexity of ours 
regarding the interpretation. The author goes on to say: 
 
The philosophy of praxis, then, does not present itself in a polemical 
attitude only towards the philosophy of the intellectuals, which is also one of 
the tasks of formation. This task consists in criticizing common sense in order 
to promote the supersession of a widespread mode of thinking, thereby 
effecting an intellectual and moral reform (pp. 180-81). 
                                                 
9 Gramsci Q11§59, p. 1485. In English SPN, op. cit., p. 346. 
10 Q8§220, p. 1080. In English, Prison Notebooks (hereafter PN), Vol. 3, trans. J. A. Buttigieg, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 369. 
 





Baldacci diversifies what Gramsci keeps together: the critique of 
the intellectuals and the critique of common sense both belong to 
“the existing mode of thinking” and are both therefore the object 
of the “polemical” attitude of the philosophy of praxis. It does not 
seem by chance that Gramsci goes out of his way to emphasize that 
this philosophy is based on common sense. Baldacci seems to con-
sider the “formative task” (a critical-polemical one), instead, essen-
tially in the critique of common sense as the “struggle against a lower 
form of culture for an advanced culture” (pp. 180-81). He seems to 
exclude the hypothesis that the “subaltern mentality” condition may 
also involve the intellectuals and their “philosophy”: but is this 
really the case? Perhaps in order to avoid risks of being misunder-
stood, the author comments on the famous note from Notebook 4 
(Q4§33) (Passage from Knowing to Understanding to Feeling and vice-
versa from Feeling to Understanding to Knowing)11 arguing that:  
 
to effectively struggle against common sense one has to understand it (and 
thus to feel through it), since only then can one understand how to link 
dialectically that common feeling and understanding to knowing,  
 
using Gramsci’s criterion of living philology to understand “what 
type of conformism” the scholar “has internalized” (p. 190).  
 
However, in our view a “democratic pedagogy” – far from 
secondary as compared with the way in which the educator relates 
to the common sense of the person being educated (and the 
philosophy of the intellectual to the philosophy of comment sense) 
– is a still-open question requiring further investigation. 
 
6. From subalterns to leaders 
From the pedagogical stance the basic problem of the Notebooks 
is, in Baldacci’s view, to establish in what conditions it is possible for the 
subaltern subjects to acquire a mentality of leaders. First of all, the con-
dition of subalternity does not coincide with that of oppression 
                                                 
11 In English, PN Vol. 2, cit., 1996, p. 173. In agreement with the translation strategy used by 
Hoare and Nowell-Smith for the second draft “C” text (SPN, op. cit., p. 418: Q12§13, p. 1396), 
Buttigieg here renders the single word “sentire” in two senses (“understanding” and “feel-
ing”); elsewhere in the words quoted (the first draft “A” text), for the verbs capire and, in this 
context, comprendere, there is no ambiguity and they both are translated “understand”. [Tr. note.]  
 





indicated by Freire in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed.12 Oppression is a 
state of “coercion and potential violence”, of “harassment and 
perfidy”, in the face of which we are essentially impotent: sub-
alternity is instead “dependence and subjection, often accompanied 
by subordinate consent” (p. 257). Gramsci’s pedagogy of the subalterns 
(p. 258) would before all put at the centre the “struggle against 
common sense for the transformation of mentality” (p. 253). 
Baldacci’s argument has current conditions as its background: 
how in the real situation of today is this struggle to be carried out, 
taking account of the new forms of subalternity conveyed by the 
economic-ideological paradigm of “neoliberalism”? Today’s 
hegemonic processes present the specific profile according to 
which “the hegemonic side prevails over that of coercion” (p. 256). 
The huge concentration of hegemony-consent is expressed in the 
tendency, towards “single-thought forms” as a form of hegemony, 
which “incorporates a ‘pedagogic’ project of the transformation of 
man” and of the “formation of a new type of person”.13 Gramsci’s 
pedagogy of the subalterns is important and useful in so far as it knows 
how to “pose the question of emancipation not only in a ‘negative’ 
form” but in the constructive terms of a “transformation of the 
subaltern mentality into the mentality of leaders, and thence of the 
positive freedom of thinking by oneself and playing an active role in 
taking collective decisions” (p. 258). The formation of a “new type 
of producer” must then proceed hand in hand with the “super-
session of cultural subalternity, with the conquest of the mentality 
of leaders, in order to take an active part in the course of history, 
instead of undergoing this fatalistically” (p. 256). 
 
7. Every social forest finds nutrition in its roots 
The author assumes the hypothesis of the modified current 
scenario, that of a “post-Fordist” economy in which “social conflict 
has been fragmented on many fronts, and in which left culture has 
changed form and lost vitality, yielding to the hegemony of neo-
liberalism” (p. 156). Pedagogy too finds itself faced with new chal-
                                                 
12 P. Freire, Pedagogia do Oprimido, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968; and subsequent editions 
Porto: Edições Afrontamento. In English Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. M. Ramos, New York, 
Herder and Herder, 1970 and, for recent editions, New York: Continuum. 
13 [In Gramsci’s “C” texts, the phrase in English is used as here in Q15§74, p. 1833 (FSPN, op. 
cit., p. 274: “Freud and the Collective Man”) and as “a new type of man” in Q22§2, p. 2146 
(SPN, op. cit., p. 286 - tr. note).] 
 





lenges and is seeking new solutions, and without doubt the book 
attains the objective of calling attention to the pedagogic thought of 
Gramsci, an important author in so far as he puts in a central 
position the need to supersede new forms of mental-cultural 
subalternity. We said earlier: between the two sides of Gramscian 
pedagogy (education as antithesis/critique of common sense and education 
as a new conformism), Baldacci inclines towards the vitality above all 
of the former. But we should also say: in concrete terms, is it really 
possible to educate by exercising only the critique of a given com-
mon sense without in some way attempting, together with that, to 
foster the birth or maintenance of a certain social order and order 
of values (more or less knowingly conformant to a determinate 
mode of production)? If one does not also assume the responsibility 
for the thesis (remaining here within the metaphor of the dialectic) – 
in other words favouring the diffusion of a system of reference 
beliefs, principles and values, such as communism was for Gramsci 
– is educational action still possible? In effect, Baldacci seems to see 
this system of values in the construction of a “left” culture, putting 
at the centre the “emancipation from subalternity” as the “pivoting 
point of the democratic perspective” (p. 262). The volume deals 
with the “democracy-education” link to the extent that the “eman-
cipation from cultural subalternity” coincides with the “emancipation 
of the intelligence”, with the development of the capacity to think: 
“only education can go beyond subalternity”, since it allows the 
formation of “mental habits that are critical towards the dominant 
common sense”, which favour the supersession of the “division 
between a formation for leading groups and one directed at the 
subalterns” (loc. cit.). The author’s final appeal is to accept an “open 
challenge” but a problematic one: that of not “renouncing liberal-
democratic ideology” but “deepening and extending it in the 
direction of a radical and plural democracy” (loc. cit.). On the return 
to radicality (where we include the etymological sense of “rootedness”), 
one cannot but agree, bearing in mind however that every small 
plant, every tree, group of trees or social forest has roots of its own. 
These cannot be torn up in the name of the need for an abstract 
“democratic” clean-up, since the terrain in which they sink their 
roots is their condition for the survival of the living organism itself 
in all its complexity. “Beyond whose subalternityi?” perhaps remains an 
open question, on which it is worthwhile continuing to reflect. 
